1988; Bykvist and Hattiangadi 2007, 2013 ). An example is the proposition it is raining and nobody believes it is raining. Though this proposition might well be true, it cannot be truly believed, because if one believes it, then it is false.
The blindspot objection goes as follows. Consider a simple norm of truth such as the following:
TRUTH: One ought to believe that p if and only if p is true. Now, suppose for the sake of argument that the proposition it is raining and nobody believes that it is raining is true. In this circumstance, TRUTH entails that you ought to believe that it is raining and nobody believes that it is raining. This consequence is unpalatable: surely, one is under no obligation to believe this proposition, even if it is true (Bykvist and Hattiangadi 2007, 2013 ). Yet, this is not the crucial difficulty posed by true blindspots. The real difficulty is that in the face of true blindspots, TRUTH is unsatisfiable: if you do what TRUTH entails that you ought to do, if you do believe that it is raining and nobody believes that it is raining, then what you believe is false, and TRUTH entails that it is not the case that you ought to believe it. This violates the principle that 'OUGHT' IMPLIES 'CAN SATISFY' (Bykvist and Hattiangadi 2007, 2013) :
'OUGHT' IMPLIES 'CAN SATISFY': If one ought to w, then it is possible for one to w while still being obligated to w.
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Greenberg addresses the blindspot objection in his defence of DA in a way that is likely to resonate with many. However, as I will argue, his response is unsuccessful. The next section contains a brief characterization of Greenberg's response. The following three sections explain why it fails.
Greenberg's response
We have seen that TRUTH faces the blindspot objection. So too does DA. To see why, suppose that you have a doxastic attitude towards the proposition that it is raining and nobody believes that it is raining; perhaps you have noticed that it is not truly believable, so you have elected to disbelieve it. In this situation, DA entails that you ought to believe that it is raining and nobody believes that it is raining. Yet, if you do believe this proposition, DA entails that it is not the case that you ought to believe it. Thus, DA violates 'OUGHT' IMPLIES 'CAN SATISFY'.
Greenberg argues that these consequences of DA are unproblematic, because 'the means one should take in order to conform to DA will never involve believing the proposition that it is raining and nobody believes that it is raining (Greenberg 2018, 17) .' He reasons as follows. First, he notes that DA is an objective norm, which is 'non-transparent', in the sense that, in many cases, 3 it is not obvious whether or not one is acting in accordance with it (Greenberg 2018, 3; Cf. Boghossian 2003, 38-39; 2005, 211-212; Gibbard 2003) . If one wishes to satisfy this nontransparent norm, one needs to follow some indirect norms, whose conformity conditions are transparent, such as: Shah and Velleman 2005; Wedgwood 2002 ). The thought is admittedly intuitively compelling: we follow an evidential norm in order to conform to a fundamental truth norm, because forming our beliefs on the basis of evidence is the best means to acquiring true beliefs.
Second, in the case of blindspots, Greenberg argues that if one's aim is to conform to DA, the best strategy for one to adopt is non-belief. Suppose that one considers a blindspot proposition p in a circumstance in which one has no evidence either way whether p is true. One has a choice between two options: to believe that p or not to believe that p. If one adopts the first option, Greenberg argues, one is guaranteed to fail to conform to DA, whereas if one adopts the second option, one is not guaranteed to fail to conform to DA: either p is true, and one fails to conform to DA, or p is false, and one succeeds in conforming to it. This reasoning about the best strategy can be read off of the table below (where p is the proposition it is raining and nobody believes that it is raining) ( Table 1) :
Thus, if my epistemic goal is to conform to DA, Greenberg argues, I should choose not to believe p, since in that way I am not guaranteed to fail to achieve my goal, whereas if I believe p, I am guaranteed to fail to do so (Greenberg 2018, 17-18) .
The problem of transparent conflict
Greenberg's appeal to indirect norms in response to the blindspot problem gives rise to another: the problem of conflict (Cf. Glüer and Wikforss 2013; Hattiangadi 2010 ). An indirect norm such as EVIDENCE, which says that one's beliefs ought to be based on one's evidence, straightforwardly conflicts with DA in certain cases. For instance, if one has some doxastic attitude towards p, p is true, but one lacks evidence for p, DA entails that one ought to believe that p, while EVIDENCE entails that one ought not to. Similarly, if one believes that p on the basis of excellent evidence, but p is false, EVIDENCE entails that one ought to believe that p, while DA entails that it is not the case that one ought to believe that p.
Greenberg makes two points in response to this objection. First, he argues that the problem of conflict between truth norms and indirect epistemic norms can be set aside as irrelevant, since this problem is not specifically connected to blindspots-as we have already noted, conflicts between truth norms and evidential norms arise whenever one has misleading evidence for a falsehood, or insufficient evidence for a truth. However, the problem of conflict does not arise specifically in connection with the blindspot problem; it arises specifically for Greenberg's proposed solution to the blindspot problem. One faces the problem of conflict when one invokes an indirect norm to resolve the difficulty blindspots pose to DA. Second, Greenberg dismisses the problem of conflict as a pseudoproblem. His rationale has been glossed above: since it is not transparent to one whether by believing p one will or will not conform to DA, one must adopt some indirect strategy, even though one might recognize that one's preferred indirect strategy is not an infallible means to conforming to DA. This picture of the relation between truth norms and evidential norms is widely shared (Cf. Boghossian 2003; McHugh 2012; Shah 2003; Wedgwood 2002 ). However, even in cases in which it is not transparent to one whether p is true or false, the conflict between EVIDENCE and DA is transparent. Assuming Bivalence, 5 we know in advance that p is either true or false, so in any case in which EVIDENCE entails that one ought to suspend judgment, it is transparent to one that EVIDENCE conflicts with DA, which is guaranteed to entail either that one ought to believe that p, or that one ought to believe that not-p. And on any occasion in which it is transparent to one that EVIDENCE conflicts with DA, one cannot sincerely regard oneself as following EVIDENCE as a means to conforming to DA, since on any such occasion, it is transparent that following EVIDENCE is not a means to satisfying DA. The problem of transparent conflict can be brought into sharper relief if we compare indirect rule-following in the epistemic case with indirect rulefollowing in the moral case. For example, consider the objective consequentialist rule that one ought to maximize value. Since it is often very difficult to know which act maximizes value, an objective consequentialist might argue that one can only follow the objective consequentialist rule indirectly, by following a rule that is transparent, such as the subjective consequentialist rule that one ought to maximize expected value. In many cases, since one does not know which action maximizes value, one does not know whether objective consequentialism conflicts with subjective consequentialism, and one can sincerely follow the latter, as a means to following the former. 6 In contrast, in the epistemic case, for all propositions that satisfy Bivalence, one knows in advance that a truth norm such as DA will conflict with an evidential norm such as EVIDENCE whenever the latter recommends suspension of judgment. In such a case, one cannot sincerely claim to be following EVI-DENCE as a means to satisfying DA (Cf. Hattiangadi 2010). Greenberg suggests a solution to the problem of transparent conflict in what he calls 'three-option cases', which is 'to claim that there is a contraryto-duty obligation to err on the side of caution'; that 'there is a second objective truth norm which states that if one violates DOXASTIC ATTITUDE, one ought to do so by not having a belief rather than having a false 5 The principle of bivalence states that for any proposition p, p is either true or false. One might worry that there are some propositions that are non-bivalent, for instance if one thinks that the future is metaphysically indeterminate, and that contingent propositions about the indeterminate future are neither true nor false (e.g. it will rain in exactly 100 years from now). But if so, one can merely pick an example of a blindspot for which bivalence holds, such as Goldbach's Conjecture is true and nobody believes that Goldbach's Conjecture is true. 6 Notable exceptions include 'Jackson cases', in which one knows that what subjective consequentialism recommends is sub-optimal by the lights of objective consequentialism (Jackson 1991) .
belief (Greenberg 2018, 19, fn7) .' That is, Greenberg proposes the following objective, contrary-to-duty norm in addition to DA:
DOXASTIC ATTITUDE* (DA*): If p is true, and one violates DA, one ought to do so by not believing p.
The trouble with this strategy is that DA* conflicts with DA. Suppose, for instance, that p is true, but one suspends judgment whether p. Since one has a doxastic attitude towards p and p is true, DA entails that one ought to believe p. At the same time, since one violates DA by suspending judgment whether p when p is true, DA* entails that one ought to not believe p. This is a classic doxastic dilemma: it is a situation in which one objective norm entails that one ought to do A, while another objective norm entails that one ought to do not-A. This conflict cannot be resolved by appeal to indirect norms because the clash occurs between two objective norms. Thus, the problem of transparent conflict clearly arises for Greenberg's solution to the blindspot objection. Assuming Bivalence, it is transparent that EVIDENCE conflicts with DA, and one cannot sincerely follow DA by means of following an indirect norm that transparently conflicts with it. The appeal to an additional, contrary-to-duty norm only makes matters worse, since it too conflicts with DA.
3. What is the best strategy for conforming to DA?
Greenberg's response to the blindspot objection rests crucially on the claim that not believing that p is the best strategy if one's aim is to satisfy DA. However, on closer inspection, his argument for this claim is unconvincing.
In making his case, Greenberg does not rely on either EVIDENCE or CON-
SISTENCY, but appears to assume some kind of norm of expected epistemic value, (where the expected epistemic value of a doxastic state can be assumed to be the probability-weighted value of that state). That is, he assumes something like the following indirect norm: Moreover, Greenberg suggests that the fundamental epistemic value is conformity to DA, since the value of conforming to DA is weighed against the disvalue of not conforming to DA. However, he mischaracterizes the relevant outcomes in the blindspot case, and thus miscalculates their values. If these options are more accurately described, it becomes clear that it is not the case that the best strategy to adopt as a means to satisfying DA never involves believing a blindspot. First, Greenberg fails to distinguish between failing to conform to DA and neither conforming nor not conforming to DA. One fails to conform to a norm N if one either fails to do something that N entails that one ought to do, or if one does something that N entails that one ought not to do; one neither conforms nor fails to conform to N if one does something to which N assigns no deontic status at all. Greenberg conflates failure to conform to DA with neither conforming nor not conforming to DA in claiming that if one believes a blindspot, one is guaranteed to fail to conform to DA. For, he must assume here that if one has a false belief, then one fails to conform to DA. However, if p is false, DA does not entail that one ought not to believe that p; rather, it merely entails that it is not the case that one ought to believe that p. And if a norm merely entails that it is not the case that one ought to do A, doing A does not amount to failure to conform to the norm. Compare: if the dress code entails that it is not the case that one ought to wear black tie, one does not fail to conform to the dress code by wearing black tie.
9 This is because, if a norm entails that it is not the case that one ought to do A, this entailment is fully compatible with one's being permitted to do A. Though it may be true that in believing a false blindspot one does not succeed in conforming to DA, one need not thereby fail to conform to it. Thus, if one believes a blindspot, one is not guaranteed to fail to conform to DA. Second, Greenberg misleadingly runs together disbelief 10 and suspension of judgment, by treating both as states of non-belief. However, in the case of false blindspots, suspension of judgment and disbelief do not both amount to conformity to DA. Though it is true that if one disbelieves a false blindspot, one does indeed succeed in conforming to DA-since one believes that not-p when not-p is true-if one suspends judgment in a false blindspot, one fails to conform to DA, since one suspends judgment ought not to believe it (by Greenberg's lights). Thus, this norm fares no better than EVIDENCE in addressing the problem of conflict. 9 This means that DA does not explain why we should avoid having false beliefs -an epistemic norm that, in the context of Greenberg's overall strategy, he might wish to explain.
10
I take disbelief here to be belief in the negation.
in not-p, when not-p is true. Thus, not believing a false blindspot does not always constitute success in conforming to DA. So, even if we go along with the assumption that epistemic value consists in conformity to DA, we need to evaluate the outcomes associated with suspension of judgment and disbelief separately, rather than evaluating them together as states of non-belief. Second, we need to work with a more fine-grained valuation that takes into account the difference between failing to conform to DA and neither conforming to DA nor failing to conform to it. Let's say that conforming to DA has a value of +1, failing to conform to DA has a value of −1, and neither conforming nor failing to conform to DA has a value of 0, since such a state is plausibly neutral.
11 With this in place, we can represent the epistemic values associated with the available doxastic attitudes towards a blindspot with the help of the following table. (Once again, let p be the proposition that it is raining and nobody believes that it is raining, and assume that the subjective probability of p is 0.5) ( Table 2) : With this more fine-grained valuation of the outcomes in place, the expected value of believing that p is equal to the expected value of disbelieving that p, which is 0, while the expected value of suspending judgment whether p is −1. Thus, it seems that if one's aim is to conform to DA, the best strategy is to avoid suspension of judgment whether p, and to either believe that p or disbelieve that p. This result is unwelcome, since it places believing a blindspot and disbelieving a blindspot as on a par, and hence does not entail that one should never believe a blindspot, if one's aim is to satisfy DA. An obvious way to respond here might be to reformulate DA as follows:
DOXASTIC ATTITUDE** (DA**): If one has any doxastic attitude at all towards p, then if p is true, one ought to believe that p, and if p is false, one ought to disbelieve that p.
If the fundamental epistemic value is conformity to DA**, then the outcome in which one believes a false blindspot has a value −1, since belief in a falsehood constitutes failure to conform to DA**, making the expected value of believing a blindspot −0.5, while leaving the expected value of disbelieving a blindspot unchanged at 0. In this case, the PRINCIPLE OF EXPECTED EPISTEMIC VALUE generates the desired result -in the case of a blindspot, the best means to satisfying DA never involves believing a blindspot. However, the problem of transparent conflict remains, and DA** violates 11 This is because when one considers a case in which one has no doxastic attitude at all towards a proposition, DA assigns this state no deontic status, so its value vis-à-vis conformity to DA can only be neutral.
'OUGHT' IMPLIES 'CAN SATISFY'. Indeed, as we shall see in the next section, DA** gives rise to a particularly egregious violation of this principle.
Unsatisfiable norms and catch-22s
For all that has been said about indirect norms, DA nevertheless violates 'OUGHT' IMPLIES 'CAN SATISFY'. Even if the best strategy to adopt if you aim to conform to DA is to not believe blindspots, if you do adopt the recommended strategy, and either disbelieve or suspend judgment 12 in a true blindspot, DA entails that you ought to believe it. Greenberg acknowledges this point, but dismisses it. He says, 'it's not clear that violating ['OUGHT' IMPLIES 'CAN SATISFY'] is problematic. Now we've shown that the means one should take to conform to DA will never involve believing blindspots, it's unclear that there remains any theoretical support for ruling out DA on the grounds that it violates this principle.' (Greenberg 2018, 17) According to Greenberg, obligation-limiting norms, such as 'OUGHT'
IMPLIES 'CAN SATISFY,' are typically justified on the grounds that the norms that they rule out are over-demanding, unfair, cannot provide guidance, or that lead one on pointless errands (Greenberg 2018, 18 ; see also Andric 2017) . What seems to have been missed here is that the justification for 'OUGHT' IMPLIES 'CAN SATISFY' is precisely that it rules out norms that are deeply unfair and lead one on pointless errands (See also Raleigh 2013). What could be more unfair to an agent than a norm that cannot be satisfied? And what errand is more pointless than the attempt to satisfy a norm that is cannot be satisfied? 
−1
Failure to conform to DA. 12 It is worth noting that this implication might have been avoided if suspension of judgment were not conceived of as a doxastic attitude in its own right. However, Greenberg (2018) argues at some length that suspension of judgment is a doxastic attitude in its own right, a kind of committed agnosticism, to be distinguished from the state in which one has no doxastic attitude at all. In view of this, Greenberg might consider adding that the best way to not believe a blindspot is to adopt no doxastic attitude towards it at all (not even suspension of judgment). However, if one considers a blindspot, and then commits to adopting no doxastic attitude towards it, one seems to be in a state of committed agnosticism that is no longer easily distinguished from suspension of judgment.
The unfairness and futility inherent in unsatisfiable norms can be brought into sharper relief if we compare these norms with catch-22s. A canonical example of a catch-22, from Joseph Heller's (1955) novel of that name, is a military rule that states that a fighter pilot may be excused from flight missions if the pilot is evaluated by the squadron's flight surgeon and found to be insane. The catch-22 is that one could only be deemed insane if one were to request an evaluation from the flight surgeon; yet, if one did make such a request, this would be taken by the flight surgeon as conclusive evidence that one was sane, and one would not be excused from flight missions. In this catch-22, one may be excused only if one requests an evaluation; yet, if one were to request an evaluation, one would not be permitted to be excused. The structure of this catch-22 is a set of norms that has the following pair of entailments (where P is the deontic operator 'it is permissible that', A is a sentence stating that an agent performs an act, where 'act' is broadly construed to include having a doxastic attitude of some kind, → is the material conditional, □→ is the counterfactual conditional, and C is a condition or circumstance):
Catch-22s are in a certain sense incoherent. In Heller's example, one is permitted to do something under certain conditions, but if those conditions were to obtain, one would not be permitted to do it, and any attempt to do what one is permitted to do would lead one on a pointless errand. In the face of blindspots, DA has a similar structure to this catch-22, but where the incoherence involves a loop that is tighter still, since these norms entail that an act has a certain deontic status, but that it necessarily lacks that very deontic status if the act is performed. Let's call these norms or sets of norms 'catch-44s'. What they entail is the following, where ◻ is the metaphysical necessity operator, and O is the deontic operator 'it ought to be the case that':
As in Heller's catch-22, DA sends agents on pointless errands, since it makes obligatory a course of action which is not obligatory if performed. In order to underscore what is particularly problematic about norms with entailments exhibiting this structure, it might be useful to consider a different example: CHARITY: One ought to give to charity if and only if one does not give to charity.
CHARITY is a catch-44. It entails that one ought to give to charity, yet if one does give to charity, it entails that it is not the case that one ought to give to charity. One fails to satisfy CHARITY whether or not one gives to charity. 13 Since CHARITY entails that one ought to do something that one cannot do while still being obligated to do it, it is unfair and sends agents on pointless errands.
We can now return to DA**, which gives rise to a particularly egregious violation of 'OUGHT' IMPLIES 'CAN SATISFY': for a true blindspot, p, DA** entails that one ought to believe p; but if one does believe p, DA* entails that one ought not to believe p. That is, it is one of a class of norms which we can call 'catch-66s', which entail both:
Since 'OUGHT' IMPLIES 'CAN SATISFY' rules out catch-22s, catch-44s, and catch-66s, it is an obligation limiting principle that is justifiable on the grounds that it rules out norms that are incoherent in the sense just described. This should be justification enough, since these norms are just about as unfair as could be to the agents who are subject to them, since they require or permit courses of action that are utterly futile; a point that is vividly illustrated in Heller's novel.
Conclusion
Thus, Greenberg's defence of DA is unsuccessful. DA transparently conflicts with the indirect norms it is supposed to explain; it is not the case that the 13 It has been suggested to me that all normative claims have this form, because once an act is performed, it is no longer obligatory to perform it. Suppose, for instance, that you ought to return a book at some time, t. At t, you return the book. Now, at t+1, it is no longer true that you ought to return the book, because you have already done so. Unsatisfiable norms are not of this kind. To see why, it helps to understand 'ought' as an operator that means 'it ought to be the case that'. In the ordinary case of the obligation to return the book, it is true at all times that it ought to be the case that you return the book at t. This explains why it is true, while you are returning the book, that you are doing what you ought to do, and why it is true, after you have returned the book, that you did what you ought to do. Compare this to DA. Suppose that you have a doxastic attitude to believe a true blindspot p at time t. DA entails that it ought to be the case that you believe p at t. Yet, if you believe p at t, DA entails that it is not the case that it ought to be the case that you believe p at t. I am grateful to Ofra Magidor, John Hawthorne, and Nick Shea for discussion on this point. best strategy to adopt if one aims to conform to DA never involves believing blindspots; and it violates 'OUGHT' IMPLIES 'CAN SATISFY'. It seems that one should not believe all truths, after all.
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